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Contemporary film-philosophy – the fastest growing field in film studies 
– centers on the idea that film/cinema is capable of expressing original 
philosophy. This idea, however, has a curiously under-examined relation to a 
key inspiration for the field: Gilles Deleuze. How does the notion of film as 
philosophy connect with Deleuze’s writings on the relation between cinema 
and philosophy? In an editorial titled “What is Film-Philosophy?” David 
Sorfa, editor-in-chief of Film-Philosophy Journal, makes two claims, one that 
clarifies the field’s central idea and one that points to how it relates to Deleuze:  
1. […] Film-Philosophy supports the strong argument that 
cinema can do philosophy in a way that is unique to the 
medium. Therefore, film is not only capable of presenting 
extended thought experiments or illustrating philosophical 
concepts, but [can be] philosophy itself. 
2. With his Cinema books, Deleuze was “among the first to 
explicitly claim that films can do or be philosophy.”1 
While Sorfa adds no reference for the second claim, it can be recognized as a 
fairly common assumption in the field he overviews. Is this a valid 
assumption? Does Deleuze in or around the Cinema books claim that films can 
do or be philosophy? That is not the case, as will be detailed below. Rather, 
he underlines differences between cinematic thinking and philosophy: While 
often engaged with the same problems, and while they may even share some 
formal characteristics in thinking those problems, (and while someone like 
Resnais is said to create a rare marriage [noce] between cinema and 
philosophy), they are differentiated through Deleuze’s famous definition of 
philosophy as the art of creating concepts – a definition that is explicit at least 
as early as around Cinema 1. For Deleuze, cinematic figures of thought 
(however much they can suggest or give rise to concepts) are themselves 
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always preconceptual. A valid claim that films “can do or be philosophy” 
using Deleuze as support, would therefore have to engage with this 
differentiation between philosophy as the art of creating concepts and 
cinematic thinking as preconceptual. It would also have to engage with the 
more speculative question of whether it is possible to create a notion from 
within Deleuze’s thought as a whole that allows for the possibility of 
articulating original philosophical concepts – as Deleuze defines them (as a 
particular kind of multiplicity) – in and through film, and what this would 
mean for our understanding of the concrete form of concepts. Such 
engagement would not merely be a correction of shaky assumptions but could 
also deepen and advance the discussion of film as philosophy. While Deleuze 
is a key figure in much film-philosophy – a field centered around the idea of 
film as philosophy – substantial such engagement is largely absent, with a 
recent book by D.N. Rodowick (2015) as a semi-exception.  
 This article examines this issue, critically and speculatively, with the 
aim to re-problematize the notion of film as philosophy and initiate further 
discussion.2 Part 1 reexamines how current ideas about film as philosophy 
relate to Deleuze’s own ideas about the relationship between cinema/art and 
philosophy (spanning an interview statement about Godard in 1968 up to 
What is Philosophy? in 1991). It also looks into Deleuze’s concept of concepts 
(how he defines their internal logic and – although this is done in Part 2 – by 
which formal means he implies that they can be articulated). Part 2 takes on 
the more speculative task of trying to create from strands in Deleuze’s thought 
a notion of film as a possible formal means for philosophical concept creation. 
If the first part looks to clarify Deleuze’s positions on film and philosophy 
(often somewhat muddled in current film-philosophical writings), the aim of 
the second part resonates with the Deleuzian/Nietzschean concern with the 
formal renewal of philosophy, that is, with the development of vital new 
forms for philosophical expression.3 In this article’s examination of the idea 
of film4 as a means for such formal renewal, Deleuze’s (and Nietzsche’s) 
implicit restriction to the written word (however inspired by also the visual 
arts) will be exceeded and partly re-imagined. 
PART 1 
How Deleuze Distinguishes Between Cinematic/Artistic 
Thinking and Philosophy 
Deleuze in and around the cinema books conceives of cinematic thinking 
and philosophical thinking as formally different, even if they can share some 
characteristics and often inform each other as engaged with the same or 
similar problems, and the main formal difference has to do with concepts. In 
What is Philosophy? Deleuze describes concept creation as the exclusive right 
of philosophy, that which secures a function for philosophy,5 and in Cinema 1 
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filmmakers are said to “think with movement-images and time-images instead 
of concepts.”6 And as he says even more strongly in a 1987 talk at Femis (the 
French national film school): “those of you who do cinema […] do not invent 
concepts – that is not your concern – but blocks of movement/duration.”7  
 Since “Cinema’s concepts are not given in cinema,” as Deleuze writes 
at the end of Cinema 2, “cinema’s theory must therefore be produced by 
philosophy “as conceptual practice.”8 While the concepts thereby produced 
“are cinema’s concepts, not theories about cinema,”9 this means only that they 
must be created by philosophy in accordance with the specificity of cinema’s 
structures and logics of expression, instead of applying ready-made concepts 
from other areas.10 While the concepts should directly resonate with the signs 
and images and thought-structures of the films, they are still produced by 
philosophy. A concept of a cinematic thought structure is thereby not merely 
a putting into words of that cinematic thought structure, it is the result of an 
extraction of that structure onto a philosophical plane on which it is 
recomposed according to the logic of that philosophical plane while staying 
true to the specificity of what is conceptualized (more on this conceptual 
procedure below). In this sense, the concept introduces something new.  
 Certainly, in the preface to the English edition of Cinema 1, Deleuze 
famously writes that “it is not sufficient to compare the great directors of the 
cinema with painters, architects or even musicians. They must also be 
compared with thinkers.”11 As the word thinkers is here clearly a short hand 
for philosophical thinkers, a main premise of the book is introduced: great 
filmmakers work on a level of advanced thought comparable to philosophers; 
there is no intellectual hierarchy between them. The latter is clearer in a 
similar statement Deleuze made in an interview conducted by Serge Daney in 
1983: “The great cinematic authors are thinkers just as much as painters, 
musicians, novelists and philosophers (philosophy has no special 
privilege).”12 He is thereby not saying that the work of thinking and the 
thought products of filmmakers are the same as that to which it is compared 
– whether compared with the work of painters, architects, musicians, 
novelists, or philosophers. For Deleuze, rather, cinema and philosophy are 
comparable thinking modes with key formal differences having most 
significantly to do with concept creation. While the (controversial but 
influential) definitions in What is Philosophy? revolving around concept 
creation are done in relation to science and a generalization called art, nothing 
said about concepts in or around the cinema books, as we saw above, 
contradicts the later definitions – in brief, filmmakers do not create concepts. 
We can therefore claim that cinematic thinking, no longer discussed explicitly 
in What is Philosophy?, is in this sense subsumed into the category of art: a 
particular set of modes of thought that do not involve concept creation.13 So 
let us look a bit closer at the distinctions made in this book between 
philosophy and art.  
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 Famously, a philosophical practice is here argued to contain three basic 
elements. The laying out of (pre-philosophical, “problematic”) planes of 
immanence14 on which concepts are created and on which they can make 
sense, along with the invention of conceptual personae that help dramatize 
and narrow down the problems enough for there to concept creation. A 
similar separation is found in art, in which there is a plane of composition and 
the creation of percepts/affects and aesthetic figures. While Deleuze 
acknowledges how philosophy and art can “intersect and intertwine” in 
specific cases they do so “without synthesis or identification.”15 And although 
an element from one can be brought into the other, that element is then re-
reconstituted for the milieu into which it is brought. For instance, an artistic 
sensation on a plane of composition can become the sensation of a concept, 
which transforms the artistic sensation into a philosophical component. Three 
other kinds of intersections between art and philosophy are discussed, in 
which the distinction is still in the end fully maintained:  
1.) Art, science, and philosophy tend to become indiscernible at the 
point in which they intersect with the chaos with which they all 
grapple.16 But this does not speak against Deleuze’s many 
declarations of their distinct properties beyond that intersection.  
2.) Trickier is the “intrinsic type of interference” that occurs when 
concepts and conceptual personae like Nietzsche’s Zarathustra are 
placed on a plane that is “difficult to qualify.”17 But difficult to 
qualify does not mean cannot be qualified. And Deleuze qualifies 
Nietzsche’s plane as a philosophical plane.  
3.) Trickiest is the type of literary writers that Deleuze calls “half 
philosophers” who make exchanges between the respective 
elements of art and philosophy in a particular and systemic way: 
they do not re-constitute elements to fit the mode of thought they are 
taken into, but rather take some elements from philosophy and some 
from art and create hybrids. However, even here the sharp 
differences are preserved between the elements that are mixed – they 
make hybrids of art and philosophy but “do not produce a 
synthesis” of the two.18   
While some ambiguities may remain regarding the half philosophers, 
Deleuze is particularly strict regarding one element: concepts. The half 
philosophers either place conceptual personae on planes of composition or 
aesthetic figures on planes of immanence. But their hybrids are never 
described to form or express concepts. As Deleuze writes: “only philosophy 
creates concepts in the strict sense” and the “exclusive right of concept 
creation secures a function for philosophy.”19  
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Rodowick’s Subtle Nudges of Deleuze Towards and Into the 
Film as Philosophy Position 
Let us now reconnect with current ideas about film as philosophy that 
reference Deleuze. First of all, there are certainly scholars who follow 
Deleuze’s separation between philosophy and (however philosophically 
inclined) cinematic thinking.20 Then there are scholars who utilize a looser 
Deleuzian frame to argue for their own ideas about film as philosophy, in 
which film is said to philosophize affectively and poetically in ways explicitly 
described as non-conceptual.21 Quite a few, however, exemplified by Sorfa 
above, claim that Deleuze himself argued that films can do/be philosophy. In 
the introduction to a recent anthology called Film as Philosophy, editor Bernd 
Herzogenrath makes a partly similar statement while also going into the issue 
of concepts: “If the rubric of film as philosophy claims films or cinema can do 
philosophy, then it is not the institutionalized version of academic philosophy 
(i.e., the production of propositional knowledge) but rather what Deleuze and 
Guattari call the ‘creation of concepts.’”22 However, while Herzogenrath 
thereby brushes up against the problem discussed here, he goes on to describe 
this in terms of Deleuze’s notion of a new image of thought more broadly 
instead of his definition of concepts, so that it appears that those two things 
are the same in Deleuze, which they are not.23 In an editorial for a special issue 
on Jean-Luc Godard, John E. Drabinski more aptly and directly points 
towards this article’s concern: “If philosophy, as Deleuze has it, is primarily 
concerned with the creation of concepts, then Godard’s cinema can be said to 
create concepts in sound and image.” 24 An intriguing suggestion that, 
unfortunately, is not further developed or investigated in relation to 
Deleuze’s writings.  
 The most developed and sophisticated engagement with Deleuze for 
arguments related to the idea of film as philosophy, warrants more detailed 
examination. In the final book of his rich and rewarding trilogy on film theory, 
the humanities, and philosophy, D.N. Rodowick experimentally explores 
intersections between art, cinema, philosophy, and concepts from closely 
studied Deleuzian (along with Cavellian) perspectives. It is a tour de force in 
many regards. Nonetheless, those of his arguments that specifically pertain to 
film as philosophy, hovers between three partly conflicting positions: 1) “film 
is philosophy,”25 2) film as “a becoming-philosophy tending toward 
conceptual formation”26 and 3) film as that which “may inspire philosophy to 
give form to a concept” but whose own figures of thought are always 
“preconceptual.”27 Now, the relation between above positions 1 (film is 
philosophy) and 3 (film as preconceptual) would not necessarily be 
contradictory, if he did not explicitly argue that the first position was also 
claimed by Deleuze: “Deleuze and Cavell,” Rodowick writes, “comprehend 
cinema as expressing ways of being in the world and of relating to the world 
such that cinema is already philosophy.”28 He then qualifies this to mean that 
cinema thinks similar problems as philosophy, and that it does so 
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“preconceptually in aesthetic form.” But this is actually a shift rather than a 
qualification, since it does not explain how Deleuze could have 
“comprehended cinema” to be “already philosophy” given that cinema – 
however advanced in its thought – is preconceptual and philosophy is chiefly 
defined by its creation of concepts. Rodowick similarly writes about “an 
active philosophy immanent to the Image – a philosophy of the image given 
in or through images”29 with the implication that this is Deleuze’s position. 
But how could it be his position, given it would amount to philosophy 
without concept creation? At times Rodowick seems to try to solve this by 
including into his sentences some ambiguities regarding Deleuze’s very 
division between cinema and philosophical concept creation (a division 
Rodowick is carefully upholding at other times). “Deleuze sees conceptual 
creation in the movement- and time-images,” he for instance writes at one 
point.30  
 Along with these less convincing efforts to push Deleuze into the film-
is-philosophy position, however, Rodowick also provides more useful and 
thought-provoking nudges of Deleuze towards (but not into) this position. 
This involves finding similarities in formal structure between how Deleuze 
describes images in Cinema and philosophy in What is Philosophy? They can be 
boiled down to two types:  
1. Similarities in formal logic between cinema and philosophy. E.g. 
Deleuze describes concepts as well as movement- and time-images 
as fragmentary open wholes, and filmic images/figures involve 
planes of immanence rather than planes of composition.  
2. Filmic images and figures of thought understood as maps or 
sketches of the intensive features of concepts.31    
While Rodowick still never brings this to bear against Deleuze’s 
categorization of film as always preconceptual, especially the second type of 
similarity is relevant for a more speculative discussion of what philosophical 
conceptualization in and through film could mean from a Deleuzian 
perspective. We will therefore reconnect towards the end with the similarities 
found by Rodowick. But if a filmic figure of thought can sketch the intensive 
features of concepts, as Rodowick argues, what are those intensive features? 
By what definition does a concept even have intensive features?  
Deleuze’s Concept of Concepts 
Deleuze’s definition, as Daniel Smith notes, “differs significantly from 
previous conceptions of the concept.”32 The famous critique in Difference and 
Repetition against a traditional philosophical manner of thinking that Deleuze 
calls representation, includes a critique of representational concepts (although 
they can in the end be revealed as multiplicities too, beyond their immediate 
function in given contexts). The representational concept he critiques, equals 
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a term with a fixed meaning with a given place in a syllogism or serving a 
function in a proposition: it abstracts the essence of a phenomenon or idea 
according to a logic of (static) identity and opposition/difference in relation 
to other concepts. The component parts of each representational concept are 
themselves presupposed as identities, under a head concept that brings them 
together in a generalized, abstracted identity. As such, it subordinates 
difference to identity, which bars a concept of difference in itself (although 
dialectics can splice identities as part of complex contradiction-driven 
movements, difference is still reduced to negativity – and to abstract, not real 
enough movements – and is typically related to a larger general concept, and 
for these reasons it hides positive movements of differentials, and thereby 
upholds the subordination of difference to identity). Representational 
concepts can certainly be a legitimate means for making sense of relations on 
the level of facts and actualities. They are limited, however, as means for 
understanding the problematic, multiplicity-like levels of reality that 
according to Deleuze are the concern of philosophy.  
In What is Philosophy? Deleuze more explicitly and systematically 
provides his own definition of concepts: a specific kind of philosophically 
defined multiplicities. A concept condenses a finite number of “intensive” 
components – of which each can itself be regarded as a concept condensing 
components, ad infinitum – that lack spatiotemporal coordinates and are 
“neither constants nor variables but pure and simple variations” that “are 
processual, modular.”33 A concept is still highly structured and defined; it 
organizes its own components in a “consistency” – internally by reciprocal 
determinations between components (that are simultaneously distinct and 
inseparable in partially overlapping zones of indiscernibility) which also 
entail “trac[ing] the contour of its components” by a point “in a state of 
survey” that “at infinite speed” is “endlessly traversing” the components 
which nonetheless are of a finite amount which makes the surveying relative, 
determined; and externally through its complex coexistence with other 
philosophical concepts and the varying problem to which it responds (and 
without which it would have no meaning).34  
While a concept results from intense work with real problems, a concept 
does not mirror or simply reference what it grips outside of philosophy: 
Concept creation involves co-creation in and through whatever is gripped in 
reality – it means bringing its specificities into a realm of philosophical 
thought, with a rigor and precision that stays true to its logic of multiplicity, 
and reworking it into a concept on a plane of immanence, which means it is 
given philosophical properties (and in a manner that, furthermore, aims to 
maximize potentials for change).  
Although this creative work is certainly formed in and through 
considerations of identities and facts (all multiplicities are found within or 
among them), such identities and facts are not treated as self-identical starting 
points or end goals of abstraction. Rather, the concept extracts from identities 
1 3 4  |  D e l e u z e ,  C o n c e p t s ,  a n d  I d e a s  a b o u t  F i l m  a s  
P h i l o s o p h y  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVI, No 2 (2018)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2018.834 
the multiplicities that are their generative conditions, and which reveals that 
their status as identities is an (objective, not illusory) effect of underlying 
generative movements, rather than static essences, movements that also make 
up potentials for the new. Consequently, what the concept grips, and creates 
in and through, is the (virtual) structure of the generative differentials – 
simpler: tendencies – that condition more stable-appearing and actual 
phenomena or ideas.  
Now, a complication here is that Deleuze reimagines “Ideas” in a way 
that is structurally similar – both concepts and Ideas are understood as 
multiplicities. While there is therefore a certain analogy between Deleuze’s 
notions of concepts and Ideas, they are not the same thing. Concepts are 
multiplicities, but “not every multiplicity is conceptual,”35 and “An idea is 
[…] not a concept, it is not philosophy. Even if one may be able to draw a 
concept from every idea.”36 Ideas, furthermore, are everywhere; they are for 
Deleuze basically an immanent organizing principle of the universe to put it 
in the most general terms (the making immanent and multiplicity-like of Ideas 
is the precise way that Deleuze reverses the Platonic notion of Ideas).37 Ideas 
are “problematic,” and we may experience them in things or situations (or 
ourselves) as that which appears more profound in them. Some may appear 
demanding and disturbing and force us to really think. There are obviously 
non-philosophical creative thought responses to human encounters and 
engagements with such problematic Ideas. If philosophy’s response is in the 
final instance concept creation, art or cinema responds by creating thought in 
the form of blocks of sensations or movement/durations.  
The Term “Concept” in Deleuze’s Discussion of Eisenstein  
In Chapter 7 (“Thought and Cinema”) of Cinema 2, Deleuze actually does 
write about cinematic expressions of “concepts.” These expressions, however, 
are discussed as part of the representational thought logic underlying the 
classical cinema of the movement-image, here exemplified by Eisenstein, in 
which films tend to indirectly represent – however formally inventive – an 
organic totality, a rational whole in the sense of a “concept” that “is 
presupposed,” both as “the logos which unifies the parts,” and a more vague, 
affective sense of a coherent totality.38 Even “the fundamentally open 
character of the whole does not compromise [this organic] model, on the 
contrary,” Deleuze writes, since the plurality of images is “internalized in a 
concept as the whole which integrates them” along with “the ideal of 
knowledge as harmonious totality.”39  
 As Deleuze here uses the term concept both with reference to his notion 
of representational thought, and more directly to Eisenstein’s own use of the 
term in his theoretical writings, he references an understanding of concept 
clearly in conflict with his own. Furthermore, these concepts cannot really be 
understood as philosophical concepts, even non-Deleuzian notions of 
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philosophical concepts, so much as concepts in a much wider sense of the 
term: what in Eisenstein himself is “the transmuting to screen form”40 of 
mostly pre-existing abstract conceptions, ideas, viewpoints, or conventions,41 
collected under a head concept such as the “cosmic celebration of the workers’ 
triumph.”42 So concepts here are more like general or abstract ideas. And 
philosophical concepts, Deleuze writes in What is Philosophy?, “must not be 
confused with general or abstract ideas.”43   
PART 2 
The Peculiar 1968 Comment on Godard’s New Means  
If  from his cinema books and onwards Deleuze becomes quite strict with 
the differences between cinematic forms of thought and philosophical 
concepts, there appears to be an opening for a more radical relation between 
cinema and philosophy in an earlier comment on Godard made in a 1968 
interview:  
Godard transforms cinema by introducing thought into it. 
He didn’t have thoughts on cinema, he doesn’t put more or 
less valid thought into cinema; he starts cinema thinking [il 
fait que le cinéma pense], and for the first time, if I’m not 
mistaken. Theoretically [A la limite], Godard would be 
capable of filming Kant’s Critique or Spinoza’s Ethics, and it 
wouldn’t be abstract cinema or a cinematographic 
application. Godard knew how to find both a new means 
and a new “image.”44  
What is said here? The implication seems to be that Godard found new means 
to do philosophy in and through film. But in what sense? Would the definition 
of philosophy as concept creation apply here? Or is this statement rather in 
line with Cinema 2 in which Godard is central in Deleuze’s discussion of the 
new image of thought of modern cinema, which precisely do not include 
concept creation? We should underline how central Godard is at the end of 
Cinema 2 for Deleuze’s sharp differentiations between filmic thinking and 
philosophy as the art of creating concepts. While Godard and other “great 
cinema authors” are indeed described as philosophers/theorists – and 
Deleuze here basically equates philosophy and theory45 – this is only in what 
they say or write outside of their films: “in talking,” Deleuze writes, “they 
become something else, they become philosophers or theoreticians.”46 This 
notion of becoming philosophers through talking, certainly implies an 
assumption that philosophy can appear when these filmmakers shift to the 
medium of words, and words only.   
  The 1968 statement quoted above – which covers the same ground: the 
relation between thought, cinema, philosophy, and new images – points in a 
different direction. First of all, while Godard is here said to have introduced 
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“thought” into cinema, it is assumable that long-time cineaste Deleuze 
already at this point (later made obvious in his cinema books) considered 
cinema and its “great cinema authors” to have been thinking long before 
Godard – representationally or otherwise – and is here likely using the term 
though as a shorthand for philosophical thought, which the references to Kant 
and Spinoza further indicate. Now, since a philosophical practice for Deleuze 
spans more aspects than concept creation – intensive grappling with 
problems, planes of immanence, conceptual personae (which all form the 
conditions for concept creation) – Deleuze may have meant that Godard 
invented means for expressing such other aspects – such as the new image of 
thought that Deleuze repeatedly comes back to in discussions of both 
philosophy and cinema (while still keeping them separated)47 – rather than 
filmic means for concept creation. But that would not much explain the 
reference to Kant, who for Deleuze especially around 1968 epitomizes the old 
representational image of thought in philosophy (however much he is also 
credited with revolutionizing the idea of the cogito by fracturing it through 
introducing the factor of time), and is therefore here not exemplifying the new 
image of thought, but rather great works of philosophy – and as he describes 
some of Kant’s work in What is Philosophy?: “a blast of original concepts.”48 
Since planes of immanence and grappling with problems in cinema was not 
invented by Godard, he must have invented means capable of doing 
philosophy more fully.  
This would only be to say that Godard had invented a filmic form with 
perhaps yet unrealized potential to fully express philosophy (it is therefore 
not to say that any of Godard’s actual films fully realized the potential, or that 
they are (or aren’t) comparable with the philosophical scope or depth of 
Kant’s or Spinoza’s work). If we connect49 this 1968 statement, then, with 
Deleuze’s later definition of philosophy we can make a crack in the rationale 
for his distinction between cinema and philosophy, through which could pass 
the idea that such filmic new means hold the potential – theoretically, at the 
limit – for philosophical concept creation. Would that be formally possible in 
light of Deleuze’s later definition of philosophy? Are his later definitions 
implicitly tying philosophical conceptualization to a given actual form, that 
of words?  
The Actual, Concrete Forms of Concepts 
This question leads us to look at What is Philosophy? from an unusual 
angle. To the three realms defined in relation to each other – philosophy, art, 
science – we can add a partly implied analytic division between each realm’s 
incorporeal, intensive, or virtual components and what could be called their 
actual or material forms. The incorporeal components of philosophy include 
most generally planes of immanence, conceptual personae, and concepts, and 
in art, planes of composition, aesthetic figures, and blocks of sensations. 
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However, to create them means (for at least parts of the thinking process), as 
Deleuze writes, to “proceed by” some kind of actual form, from which the 
incorporeal components are said to be “extracted.”50 Art proceeds by/extracts 
from many different materials – stone, steel, a canvas, paint, etc. – and slightly 
less concretely, lines, colors, shapes, etc. The incorporeal components of a 
particular painting are unavoidably connected to the paint and the canvas and 
to its lines and colors – and art is in this way uniquely “preserved” in and 
through its mostly very concrete material.51 And we find a similar structure 
in the Cinema books, in which Deleuze discusses the concrete material forms 
of the moving image, the film strip, camera, projection, video technology, etc., 
and in the sense of the “technical means which [for instance] directly carry the 
time-image.”52 What about the actual forms for the incorporeal elements of 
philosophy? While philosophy, according to Deleuze, isn’t materially 
preserved in the same sense as art, philosophy cannot fully exist (as the art of 
creating concepts) without being carried by an actual form.  
Does this form have to be words, and words only? While Deleuze never 
addresses this question, he makes some statements about the relation between 
philosophical concepts and words/language. There is the “baptism of the 
concept” that involves using words “to designate them” (words that outside 
of or prior to their baptizing function may be archaic, new, familiar, 
extraordinary, barbarous, shocking etc. – whatever a specific concept 
demands).53 Philosophy, he also writes, “uses sentences of a standard 
language” and even “proceeds by sentences,” and “from sentences or their 
equivalent, philosophy extracts concepts.”54 So, the formal articulation of 
philosophical concepts proceeds through sentences of standard language 
(more specifically: there is the creation of a philosophical language within 
language capable of carrying the incorporeal, non-discursive, non-
propositional structures of virtual consistency that is a concept). However, 
Deleuze says nothing about whether words/sentences are the only actual 
form available for the articulation or “baptism” of philosophical concepts. 
When writing that philosophy proceeds by sentences, this is part of a 
paragraph that contrasts how philosophy extracts concepts from language, 
from how science and art extracts their incorporeal elements from language. 
And since art extracts from language only when it uses language at all, it 
would seem that philosophy too could extract concepts from language when 
they do so, without being by definition tied to only using language. And in 
stating that philosophy proceeds by sentences “or their equivalent,” despite a 
lack of further elaboration on what an equivalent could be, this seems to 
provide a direct opening from sentences solely made up of words.    
Film as a Formal Means, Not a Discipline  
In order for it to make sense to regard film as capable of pushing through 
these openings, we must think of film as a formal means – as moving image 
with sound – rather than a field or discipline generalized (with however many 
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subcategories) as cinema or art.55 If cinema (as Deleuze understands the term) 
is a category comparable to philosophy, film in the sense of moving image 
with sound belongs to a different kind of category – formal means or media – 
more comparable to a category like the written word. As a formal means, the 
written word can be used by different fields or disciplines – including 
philosophy, science, and art. The moving image with sound should be 
understood to be similarly open to express whatever.  
 Including original philosophical concepts? At this point we should be 
able to say: Why not? Even the traditional concept of concept, with its roots 
in both conceiving and mental imagery, seem fundamentally unbound by 
having to come in the form of words. And there is nothing in Deleuze’s 
definition that in principle ties concepts any more to words. And if we 
redefine film/cinema as a formal means, as moving image with sound instead 
of a field or a discipline, we short-circuit Deleuze famous distinction between 
“having an idea” in the respective fields of cinema/film and philosophy.56 So 
that it becomes possible – in principle – to have an idea of a philosophical 
concept in and through film (instead of in and through words only). 
Although, this would of course have to mean the formal renewal of the 
concept, more specifically, of its actual forms. Regarding the virtual structure 
of concepts, it would on the other hand still have to be worked out in close 
accordance with Deleuze’s definitions, so as to make sense for them to be 
called concepts instead of other kinds of Ideas-multiplicities.  
 Furthermore, for an actual filmic structure to be capable – like the 
philosophical language created within language – to carry virtual levels of a 
concept – the latter being what Deleuze actually defines in What is Philosophy? 
– it is not enough to find, as Rodowick intriguingly does, some similarities 
between concepts as fragmented open wholes, and filmic or artistic structures 
– in general. For Deleuze much in the world is fragmented and open, many 
things are multiplicities, but very few things are concepts (see discussion 
above). The question would rather have to be: which filmic structures can 
create a philosophical-conceptual film language within film language capable 
of carrying original philosophical concepts, in the precise sense of the virtual 
structures Deleuze calls philosophical concepts. Instead of talking about film 
in general, or even general image types, we would have to closely analyze the 
rare kind of films (or parts of films) that could reasonably be seen as 
containing potentials for doing so.  
Two Sets of Preliminary Components  
Sections of Godard’s video works appear particularly relevant to 
investigate from this perspective.57 As focused on Deleuze’s thought, 
however, and on how far it can be stretched in the direction of film as a means 
for creating philosophical concepts, it is outside the scope of this article to 
investigate Godard’s video works in themselves. Instead, we will suggest two 
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sets of possible preliminary components for filmic concept creation that are 
implied by Deleuze’s own statements on Godard in Cinema 2. Two caveats: in 
this short text, they can only be presented and not fully investigated. Second, 
it is also not suggested that these sets, even if fully investigated, provide all 
that is needed for philosophical conceptualization in and through film. It is 
suggested only that they may provide key foundational means (comparable 
to how the breakdown of the Movement-Image, according to Deleuze, 
provided only some of the preliminary components of the new image of 
thought, not the new image of thought itself).58 The two sets are as follows. 
 First, Deleuze’s notion of a new analytics in the films of filmmakers like 
Huillet/Straub, Duras, and Godard. Sound (including speech-acts) stops 
being a mere component of the visual image and “becomes for itself an 
autonomous sound image,” and thereby relates more or less non-linearly to 
the visual image, which on its part has become readable/legible in itself in its 
(increasingly layered or stratigraphic) entirety. In the disjunctive-conjunctive 
joining of two such autonomous images, auditory and visual, cinema becomes 
“truly audiovisual.”59 Instead of being torn apart by its disjunctive aspect, this 
audiovisuality “gains a new consistency which depends on a more complex 
link between the visual image and the sound image,” that furthermore calls 
to be read.60 And also within each image there are non-linear or “irrational” 
relations, making up “differential” connections on various levels capable of 
expressing virtual or problematic structures. The “analytic” components 
combine through a logic of multiplicity, we may say, instead of like parts in a 
representational whole.  
 Second, there are remarkable similarities between Deleuze’s discussion 
in “The Brain is the Screen” of classification as a key part of forming 
philosophical concepts,61 and his discussion in Cinema 2 of “Aristotelian” 
categorization as part of Godard’s (at least 1970s) method of filmic thinking.62 
While these terms (with their connotations of traditional representation) are 
used a bit tongue-in-cheek (referencing Borges’ Chinese taxonomy of 
animals), and Godard’s categories are “Aristotelian” only as starting points 
for non-rational series (this category AND this category AND…), these 
classifications/categorizations are in no way parodies, but re-imagined as 
flexible, intensive coordinates within fragmented, mobile wholes – problems, 
multiplicities – instead of static identities in syllogistic systems. Certainly, 
again, various kinds of Ideas are multiplicities, but only a specific kind of 
multiplicities are philosophical concepts. However, the closeness between 
Deleuze’s notion of classification as a key aspect of concept creation and his 
notion of categorization in Godard’s analytical series suggest a stronger 
closeness. Deleuze on classification and concept formation: “Every 
classification is similar: they are flexible, their criteria vary according to the 
cases presented, they have a retroactive effect, and they can be infinitely 
refined or reorganized. […] In any classification scheme, some things which 
seem very different are brought closer together, and others which seem very 
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close are separated. This is how concepts are formed.”63 And as he writes in 
What is Philosophy?, regarding how concept creation relates to existing 
concepts, “each concept carries out a new cutting-out, takes on new contours, 
and must be reactivated or recut.”64 Compared to Deleuze on categories in 
Godard: “According to Godard, categories are not fixed once and for all. They 
are redistributed, reshaped and reinvented for each film. A montage of 
categories, which is new each time, corresponds to a cutting of categories. The 
categories must, each time, surprise us, and yet not be arbitrary, must be well 
founded, and must have strong, indirect relations between themselves,” and 
as such they are “categories of problems which introduce reflection into the 
image itself.”65 This can in turn be compared to how a concept for Deleuze is 
“only created as a function of problems which are thought to be badly 
understood or badly posed” – something he calls the ”pedagogy of the 
concept,” and with how philosophers “are always recasting and even 
changing their concepts” because they “create concepts for problems that 
necessarily change.”66 Which can then be further compared to Deleuze’s 
description (with reference to Daney) of a Godardian pedagogy, how Godard 
is “finding ‘theorems’ at the edge of ‘problems’,” is “constantly creating 
categories,” and goes “from problems to categories, even if the categories end 
up presenting him with a problem again.”67 The Godardian pedagogy means 
for Deleuze that “we have to read the visual as well as hear the speech-act in 
a new way.”68 Similarly, a concept, Deleuze writes, “makes us aware of new 
variations and unknown resonances, it carries out unforeseen cuttings-out.”69 
 Curiously, none of this suggests to Deleuze that there may be sketches 
of concepts – or even more than that – in Godard’s films, as Godard is instead 
implicitly fitted into the following general category of time-image thought: 
non-chronological figures of time and the revelation of a certain 
“powerlessness” in thought, which is to say, thought’s disruptive encounter 
with the problematic. It seems that Godard has to be put into this category for 
Deleuze’s more general differentiations between cinematic thinking and 
philosophical conceptualization to work. But there is nothing stopping us 
from recutting and reorganizing this categorical differentiation, without 
really breaking out from Deleuze’s overall thought.  
Film: Moving Images, Sounds, Words, Texts   
If concepts are multiplicities, i.e. mobile compounds of heterogeneous 
intensive components, wouldn’t it make sense to also “baptize” them with 
concrete forms that are mobile and heterogeneous more so than words? This 
has nothing, however, to do with opposing images to words. Words are 
plentiful in the theory-driven kind of film that could reasonably be 
investigated as (at least closing in on) articulating original concepts in and 
through film. As John Lahey Dronsfield states, “the written word has been no 
more fully and comprehensively introduced into cinema than by Godard.”70 
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And to reconnect with the second set of preconditions above: “It is often the 
case that the written word indicates the category,” writes Deleuze on Godard, 
“while the visual images constitute the series: hence the very special primacy 
of the word over the image and the presentation of the screen as 
blackboard.”71 Or as Georges Didi-Huberman alternatively writes about 
Histoire(s) du cinema, “Godard is constantly summoning words to be read, to 
be seen, or to be heard” in a relation that “must then be understood as 
repeated collision between words and images” in which “images jostle 
together making words suddenly appear, words jostle making images 
suddenly appear, images and words collide making thought take place 
visually.”72  
This can be viewed in light of how Godard arguably keeps developing 
his “new means: “What is shown as a philosophical promise in the late-
1960s,” writes Drabinski, “becomes philosophy brought to a dense, polysemic 
cinematic language in the 1970s and after.”73 We can add to this that many of 
his videos become increasingly saturated with written words within the 
frame. Not as added to or determining/being determined by the image (in for 
instance a Barthian sense), but as woven into time-based, moving audio-
visual complexes, in which words and texts become more or less filmic 
components. Filmic words and texts can thereby take on different senses than 
in non-filmic forms of speaking or writing. What could be the function of such 
filmic speaking or writing for creating philosophical concepts in and through 
film? Are filmic words/texts even required?  
 Perhaps words help make the philosophical/theoretical aspects more 
explicit. They will likely also for a long time remain the clearest links to the 
history of philosophy – and such links are needed: however original, no 
concept is original in an ex nihilo sense, and as Deleuze writes, “every concept 
always has a history,” “there are usually bits or components that come from 
other concepts,” and a ”concept requires not only a problem through which it 
recasts or replaces earlier concepts but a junction of problems where it 
combines with other coexisting concepts.”74 As concepts relate to other 
concepts in this way, words may be needed since most prior philosophical 
concepts (still) come in the form of words, and words only.  
 Overall, film with its multiple parts – images, montage, sounds, words, 
texts – could offer the means for at least two kinds of formal development of 
philosophy: 1. Extended parameters for “recast[ing] or replac[ing] earlier 
concepts.” 2. Extended parameters for making up actual structures capable of 
carrying the virtual components of concepts: from only words, to the more 
differentiated structure of moving audiovisual compounds, in which various 
parts of the latter can carry with more direct nuance the virtual, mobile 
components of the concept. This could include some direct correlations 
between specific concrete components and specific virtual components. For 
instance, a concrete part of the form carrying the main virtual component at 
which a concept often “condenses” (such as the “I” in Descartes’ cogito).75 
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While the question of which filmic parameter could carry such a particular 
abstract component could not be answered in advance and in general, given 
words’ natural link to the history of philosophy, they may function well as 
concrete carriers of such main points around which the filmic concepts 
condenses (and which traverses the concept in a state of survey). This 
obviously does not mean (given our discussion above), they would be a 
generality that the other filmic parameters fall in line under as affective 
backing or illustrational extension. It would also not mean assigning the word 
a strict role in a linear division of labor. Rather, it would be woven into an 
audio-visual constellation that as a whole carries a conceptual multiplicity.  
 In a 1976 interview, Deleuze says about Godard’s “aural images” that 
they on the one hand “don’t seem to have any priority” over visual images, 
but that on the other hand, “some of [these aural images] have an other side 
you can call whatever you like, ideas, meaning, language, expressive aspects, 
and so on [and they] are thus able to contract or capture other images or a 
series of other images.”76 Although Deleuze here mostly seems to mean 
dictating our perception in a partly ordering or normalizing way, this could 
also be reimagined as a contraction in the sense of indicating the point at 
which a concept condenses. On the other hand, given the extent to which 
words and images are at times spiraling around and over each other in late 
Godard, and given his preference for (clear) images and suspicion of text (at 
least in theory), it would certainly be reasonable to see images functioning – 
perhaps interchangeably – as carriers of such condensing main points. In any 
case, given that film is a hybrid and temporal medium that is literarily in 
movement, there would be an unavoidable general formal renewal of the 
concrete form of the concept.  
Coda 
But again, why the need for philosophy – as the art of creating concepts 
– to extend its conceptualizing means to include film? Above, this question 
was answered in the abstract. Let us end with a concrete example: Deleuze’s 
own ongoing quest to find new means of expression culminated in a failure 
to find a form for a late book on his concept of the virtual. As Raymond 
Bellour explains: 
In the last words that we exchanged, in the summer before 
his death, Deleuze evoked […] the difficulties he was 
having with his book on the virtual, of which only a few 
pages exist. He said he was looking for a form. To this end, 
he listened to music (Ravel). And then he said, “I am not 
going to write fragments after all.” No, not fragments, as 
this had been done so inventively by Nietzsche, but 
something new, to go beyond, beyond the shares that had 
already been touched.77 
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It would be too much of a stretch to speculate on whether film could have 
offered a formal solution for Deleuze in this case. Not just because we do not 
know exactly what he found so hard to express, but also because he was not 
trained as a filmmaker and would perhaps not have had enough talent for it 
if he was. Still Godard once quipped with reference to Cinema (and with 
echoes from Alexandre Astruc):78 “All those philosophers, it’s a pity they 
didn’t make cinema... Deleuze was tempted, but instead of making a film, he 
wrote ‘a book about’.”79 Godard himself – filmmaker extraordinaire and 
maker of famously philosophically-inclined films – may have provided a 
method for “how film could express something,” as Harun Farocki stated in 
1981, but as he added, only as an “abstract, empty possibility” and that 
therefore “the real work has not yet begun.”80 
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